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As COVID-19 dominates the news, the opioid crisis rages on
unabated. The governmental response has been largely incoherent, as a
wide-ranging host of criminal and civil initiatives pepper the national
landscape. This Article discusses the current state of play in addressing the
opioid epidemic, identifying the pros and cons of each approach, and
concluding with recommendations for the best path forward. This Article
also places this debate in the context of disability rights theory, an important
yet heretofore ignored perspective, as well as therapeutic jurisprudence.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 crisis gripping our nation dominated the news
cycle throughout the spring and summer months of 2020. 1 In response to
the public’s unwavering interest in this topic, cable news outlets scrambled
to meet the demand for coronavirus updates as huge numbers of homebound consumers tune in regularly for updates. 2 The social justice protests
ǂ Eugene Gressman Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Many thanks to
Jonathan Reda, Avi Muller, and Sara Klein for their excellent research assistance.
See Elisa Shearer, Local News is Playing an Important Role for Americans During COVID19 Outbreak, PEW RES. CTR. (July 2, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/07/02/local-news-is-playing-an-important-role-for-americans-during-covid-19outbreak [https://perma.cc/UKG4-VUZX] (noting the COVID-19 outbreak has
“dominat[ed] news consumption”).
See Noah Kirsch, Ratings Surge as Homebound Americans Stay Glued to Network News,
FORBES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/noahkirsch/2020/03/17/cable-newsviewership-spikes-over-50-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/#200ff2ef2c18
[https://perma.cc/3EAY-9GW5] (noting more than fifty percent increase in cable news
viewership during COVID crisis).
1

2
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occurring across the country following the death of George Floyd in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, occupied much of the remaining bandwidth, 3
relegating other potentially newsworthy stories to the sidelines.
The opioid crisis was among the casualties of the media domination
of the COVID-19/social justice protest juggernaut. Before early 2020,
coverage of the meteoric rise in opioid-related deaths was widespread. 4 The
fact that we hear less about opioids today might suggest to some that the
crisis has abated. Sadly, nothing could be further from the truth. Deaths
from opioid overdose have not only continued throughout 2020—they
appear to be rising. The federal Overdose Detection Mapping Application
Program reported a year-to-year increase in suspected overdose deaths in
2020, with 18% in March, 29% in April, and 42% in May, with some
jurisdictions skewing even higher. 5 Experts attribute the rise to the stress and
isolation associated with the pandemic and the resultant depression that can
collectively drive vulnerable individuals to drug or alcohol abuse. 6
As the opioid epidemic rages on, state, local, and federal
governments struggle to identify the best path forward in addressing the
crisis. A patchwork of programs and initiatives have emerged nationwide
that vary in participants, procedures, and underlying philosophy. This
Article explores this divergent programmatic response to the opioid crisis,
discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each option. Part I describes
where the opioid epidemic currently stands in the era of COVID. Part II
defines opioid use disorder. Part III addresses the prevailing criminal justice
approach to managing opioid abuse, which is currently administered mostly
See Michael T. Heaney, The George Floyd Protests Generated More Media Coverage
Than Any Protest in 50 Years, WASH. POST (July 6, 2020),

3

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/06/george-floyd-protests-generated-moremedia-coverage-than-any-protest-50-years/ [https://perma.cc/5D3X-CH5R].
See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, Despair, Love and Loss: A Journey Inside West Virginia’s
Opioid
Crisis,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
13,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/us/west-virginia-opioids.html
[https://perma.cc/AQ9F-E9UN].
William Wan & Heather Long, ‘Cries for Help’: Drug Overdoses are Soaring During the
Coronavirus
Pandemic,
WASH.
POST
(July
1,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/07/01/coronavirus-drug-overdose/
[https://perma.cc/J6TE-3JKV] (finding overdose calls went up more than fifty percent in
Milwaukee County, Wisconsin). The American Medical Association has also expressed
concern about the rise in opioid-related deaths in 2020 and the corresponding need for
continued, consistent collaboration among judicial, medical, and legislative actors to address
the problem. See Marc Zarefsky, As COVID-19 Surges, AMA Sounds Alarm on Nation’s
Overdose Epidemic, AMA (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/deliveringcare/opioids/covid-19-surges-ama-sounds-alarm-nation-s-overdose-epidemic
[https://perma.cc/LGJ6-N47S].
See Lipi Roy, Collision of Crises: How Covid-19 will Propel Drug Overdose from Bad to
Worse, FORBES (May 23, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lipiroy/2020/05/23/collisionof-crises-how-covid-19-will-propel-drug-overdose-from-bad-to-worse/#d5d88757d3ab
[https://perma.cc/JR6L-SYXK].
4
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through the nation’s drug courts. Part IV explores alternatives to the drug
court model, focusing on mental health courts and involuntary psychiatric
commitment, with a discussion from the perspective of disability rights,
which is a connection that has received little attention from legal scholars
thus far. Part V introduces laudable initiatives presently underway across the
country that vindicate “restorative justice” by addressing concerns about
coercion, stigma, and dignity in response to opioid abuse. Part VI offers
recommendations for best practices going forward, both to save the lives of
persons addicted to opioids and to foster long-term recovery for those
caught in the grip of this pernicious, debilitating disease.
II.

DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING OPIOID ADDICTION

The fifth and most recent edition of the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorder (DSM5) defines “opioid use disorder” (OUD) as the:
[P]roblematic pattern of opioid use leading to clinically
significant impairment or distress, as manifested by at least
two of the following [criteria], occurring within a 12-month
period: 1. Opioids are often taken in larger amounts or
over a longer period of time than intended. 2. There is a
persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or
control opioid use. 3. A great deal of time is spent in
activities necessary to obtain the opioid, use the opioid, or
recover from its effects. 4. Craving, or a strong desire to use
opioids. 5. Recurrent opioid use resulting in a failure to
fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or home. 6.
Continued opioid use despite having persistent or
recurrent social or interpersonal problems caused or
exacerbated by the effects of opioids. 7. Important social,
occupational, or recreational activities are given up or
reduced because of opioid use. 8. Recurrent opioid use in
situations in which it is physically hazardous. 9. Continued
opioid use despite knowledge of having a persistent or
recurrent physical or psychological problem that is likely to
have been caused or exacerbated by [opioids]. 10.
Tolerance, as defined by either . . . [a] need for markedly
increased amounts of opioids to achieve intoxication or
desired effect [or] [a] markedly diminished effect with
continued use of the same amount of an opioid . . . 11.
Withdrawal, as manifested by . . . [t]he characteristic opioid
withdrawal syndrome . . . [or] [o]pioids (or a closely related
substance) are taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal
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symptoms. 7
OUD is a spectrum disorder ranging from mild to severe, in
accordance with how many of the above factors the individual manifests. 8
Those exhibiting two or three criteria over a twelve-month period are
typically classified as having “mild” OUD; by contrast, those satisfying four
or five criteria are more likely classified as “moderate,” and those with six
or more are likely to be deemed severe. 9 OUD is one of several agents
subsumed under the “substance use disorder” umbrella, all of which largely
share the diagnostic criteria specified above. 10
III.

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT
OF OPIOID ABUSE

Since individuals addicted to opioids generally obtain these drugs
illegally, responsibility for managing their substance abuse typically rests with
the criminal justice system. Rather than facing prosecution in a traditional
criminal court, first-time, nonviolent offenders usually find their cases
transferred to a “drug court.” 11 First established in 1989, 12 there are now
around 3,000 drug courts across the country. 13 Unlike other criminal courts,
drug courts endeavor to reduce recidivism by treating the addiction that
drives participants’ propensity to commit crimes. 14 However, the criminal
charges that brought participants before the court do not disappear. They
are used to incentivize completion of the prescribed treatment program by
threatening prosecution for those who are not successful. 15
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
DISORDERS 541 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
Id. at 542.
7

OF

MENTAL

8
9

Id.

The additional categories include the following: alcohol; cannabis; hallucinogens; inhalants;
sedatives; hypnotics or anxiolytics; tobacco; and other known or unknown substances. Id. at
482. For certain substances on the list, “some symptoms are less salient, and in a few
instances not all symptoms apply.” Id. at 483.
See LISA SACCO, CONG. RES. SERV., FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR DRUG COURTS: IN BRIEF 1
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44467.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5LS-NLPR].
Drug Courts, FLA. CTS., https://www.flcourts.org/Resources-Services/CourtImprovement/Problem-Solving-Courts/Drug-Courts [https://perma.cc/P39S-ZQ6K].
See SACCO, supra note 11, at 4.
Judge Peggy Hora, who presided over a drug treatment court for years, found that treating
substance abusers’ disease is critical to breaking the cycle of criminal offending. The failure
to do so, in her opinion, “invites the inevitability of recidivism.” Peggy Fulton Hora &
Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First Century: The Evolution of
the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 717, 724–26 (2008).
Drug courts tend to follow one of two models: “pre-plea” and “post-plea.” In the former,
participants’ charges are suspended and ultimately dismissed upon successful completion of
treatment. By contrast, the post-plea model requires a guilty plea up front, which suspends,
and ultimately waives, sentencing for those who complete the program. See generally RYAN
10

11

12

13
14

15
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To remediate an offender’s substance abuse problem, drug court
participants engage in a multiphase treatment program that begins with
detoxification and stabilization and ends, if the patient succeeds, with the
transition back into the community. 16 Intensive therapy, both individually
and in groups, focuses on the treatment regimen that occurs throughout the
program, along with random weekly drug testing. 17 Most programs last from
twelve to eighteen months, 18 during which relapse is not uncommon. 19 Those
who falter are held accountable for their failure to remain abstinent, with
the sanctions’ nature and severity determined by the court. 20
The critical difference between drug courts and other criminal
courts is the formers’ non-adversarial nature. While they retain control over
participants’ criminal charges, drug court judges strive to be less
authoritarian and more therapeutic, taking time to forge a personal
relationship with the individuals who appear before them. 21 These judges
function, in effect, as a team leader of the multiple parties involved in the
treatment plan: substance abuse counselors, prosecutors, defense counsel,
probation officers, and corrections personnel. 22 Managing this diverse array
of stakeholders requires a significant commitment of judicial energy and
resources. This is a stark contrast from the limited contact criminal court
S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A REVIEW OF
EVIDENCE
3
(2009),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Drug-Courts-A-Review-of-the-Evidence.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V5ND-F2TL].
SACCO, supra note 11, at 4.
WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST., PAINTING THE
CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEMSOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2011), https://www.ndci.org/wpcontent/uploads/PCP%20Report%20FINAL.PDF https://perma.cc/FLB7-C3GK].
For example, the Mason County, Washington drug court process is divided into three
phases: Orientation/Intake, three to four months; Intensive Counseling, five to eight months;
and Referral/Monitoring, four to six months. Drug Court Process:12-18 Month Program,
MASON COUNTY, WASH., https://www.co.mason.wa.us/probation/drug-court/process.php
[https://perma.cc/VR56-EDL5].
See, e.g., How Do Drug Courts Work?, RECOVERY WAYS (Dec. 26, 2018),
https://www.recoveryways.com/rehab-blog/how-do-drug-courts-work/
[https://perma.cc/BD7G-TZMK] (noting most drug courts recognize relapse is common).
Sanctions might include community service hours, electronic monitoring, curfews, extra
counseling sessions, and jail time. See SHELLI B. ROSSMAN, JANINE M. ZWEIG, DANA
KRALSTEIN, KELLI HENRY, P. MITCHELL DOWNEY & CHRISTINE LINDQUIST, THE MULTISITE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE 17 (Urb. Inst.
Just. Pol’y Ctr. ed., 2011).
See Pamela L. Simmons, Solving the Nation’s Drug Problem: Drug Courts Signal a Move
Toward Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 237, 259 (1999).
See Hora & Stalcup, supra note 14, at 726; see also Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the
THE

16
17

18

19

20

21

22

Knocking at the Door? A “Therapeutic” Approach to Enriching Clinical Legal Education
Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 400 (2006).
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judges typically have with the defendants who appear before them. 23 The
personal investment by drug court judges in the health and well-being of
those they supervise is profoundly important, as participants’ ultimate
success or failure in overcoming their addiction rests in no small part on the
durability of this relationship. 24
Drug courts’ focus on treatment to break the offending cycle,
coupled with the selfless investment of passion and energy by the judges
who oversee these programs, have proven successful in reducing recidivism
for many participants. 25 Therefore, it should come as no surprise to learn
that, in recent years, an ever-expanding number of opioid abusers found
themselves in drug courts for the treatment and management of their
disorder. 26 This would seem a perfect fit; sadly, it is not.
Following the guidance of organizations like Alcoholics
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous, 27 drug courts have historically
embraced abstinence as a core principle of recovery. While this approach
might make sense for other addiction disorders, it is decidedly against the
weight of evidence for opioids. Medication-assisted treatment (MAT) for
Two drug court judges in Massachusetts have described the multi-faceted nature of their
role that requires them to fulfill five distinct functions as cases progress: fact-gatherer,
treatment counselor, problem-solver, collaborator, and administrative taskmaster. See
Joshua Matt, Jurisprudence and Judicial Roles in Massachusetts Drug Courts, 30 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 151, 165–71 (2004).
See, e.g., Kelly Frailing, The Achievements of Specialty Courts in the United States,
SCHOLARS
STRATEGY
NETWORK
(May
16,
2016),
https://thesocietypages.org/ssn/2016/05/16/specialty-courts/ [https://perma.cc/QH7A-S559]
(“Offenders who take part in specialty court programs frequently rate interactions with the
judge as one of the more important and positive aspects of their experience.”); RACHEL
PORTER, MICHAEL REMPEL & ADAM MANSKY, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, WHAT MAKES
A COURT PROBLEM-SOLVING? 22 (2010), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/
files/What_Makes_A_Court_P_S.pdf [https://perma.cc/T437-YAXW] (noting the
frequency with which focus groups identified the importance of “[t]he role of the judge in
fostering a problem-solving culture”).
See, e.g., HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 17, at 9–12 (finding adult drug courts
reduce crime and juvenile drug courts reduce delinquency).
Harlan Matusow, Samuel L. Dickman, Josiah D. Rich, Chunki Fong, Dora M. Dumont,
Carolyn Hardin, Douglas Marlowe & Andrew Rosenblum, Medication Assisted Treatment
in US Drug Courts: Results from a Nationwide Survey of Availability, Barriers and Attitudes,
44 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 473, 475 (2013) (finding 98% of drug courts reported
opioid-dependent individuals in their populations while, in 48%, at least 20% were opioiddependent).
See Laura Amato, Marina Davoli, Carlo A. Perucci, Marica Ferri, Fabrizio Faggiano &
Richard P. Mattick, An Overview of Systematic Reviews of the Effectiveness of Opiate
Maintenance Therapies: Available Evidence to Inform Clinical Practice and Research, 28 J.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 321, 321–26 (Elsevier ed., 2005). See generally Steve
Sussman, A Review of Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous Programs for Teens,
33
EVAL.
HEALTH
PROF.
26
(2010),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4181564/ [https://perma.cc/WE5R-4UC7].
23

24

25

26

27
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opioid addiction through compounds such as buprenorphine and
methadone is widely accepted as a critical component to recovery. 28
Buprenorphine and methadone assist recovery by providing a low level of
opioids sufficient to stave off withdrawal; however, their status as opioids is
inconsistent with abstinence-only models. 29 Many drug courts refuse to
permit participants to use them. 30
This refusal fundamentally compromises the suitability of drug
courts for individuals suffering from OUD. Educating drug court judges
about the benefits of MAT is certainly helpful, but the results of such efforts
have been inconsistent at best. 31 Moreover, the need for MAT is especially
critical with opioid abusers for whom delay in treatment can prove
devastating. As drug dealers have increasingly hybridized the powerful
opioid fentanyl with other street drugs, 32 like heroin and cocaine, overdose
deaths have skyrocketed. 33
In response to the emergent, lethal threat posed by opioids in
recent years, various jurisdictions are experimenting with specialized drug

See generally Angela L. Stotts, Carrie L. Dodrill & Thomas R. Kosten, Opioid
Dependence Treatment: Options in Pharmacotherapy, 10 EXPERT OP. PSYCHOTHERAPY
28

1727
(2009),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2874458/
[https://perma.cc/D2X6-8QHW] (discussing pharmacological methods and their success in
treating opioid addiction).
A third drug, Vivitrol, is also used in this context. It differs from buprenorphine and
methadone in that it is an opioid agonist. Those who use it must, however, be drug-free for
at least one week, a fact that makes it unavailable, at least initially, for many opioid abusers
appearing in drug court. For an excellent description of these three drugs and their use in
treating opioid addiction, see Barbara Andraka-Christou, What Is “Treatment” for Opioid
Addiction in Problem-Solving Courts? A Study of 20 Indiana Drug and Veterans Courts, 13
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 189, 218–27 (2017).
See Harlan Matusow et al., supra note 26, at 476; MARIANNE MILLMAN & CHRISTINE
MEHTA, PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., NEITHER JUSTICE NOR TREATMENT: DRUG COURTS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
13
(2017),
https://phr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/phr_drugcourts_report_singlepages.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA4AJG74].
Many drug court judges cling steadfastly to their belief in the superiority of a drug-free
approach for opioid abusers, even in the face of scientific evidence to the contrary presented
at conferences or in clinical literature. See generally Barbara Andraka-Christou, Improving
Drug Courts through Medication-Assisted Treatment for Addiction, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 179 (2016).
Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid, a category of drugs “up to 10,000 times” more powerful than
morphine. UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2017: PREBRIEFING TO THE MEMBER STATES (2017), https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/
WDR_2017_presentation_lauch_version.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5CA-W8ZF].
Fentanyl analogues have been described as “the primary drivers” of opioid-related deaths.
Leo Beletsky & Corey S. Davis, Today’s Fentanyl Crisis: Prohibition’s Iron Law, Revisited,
46 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 156, 157 (2017). In a one-year period (2014–2015), deaths attributed
to fentanyl in the United States jumped by seventy-two percent. Id.
29

30

31

32

33
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courts dedicated exclusively to opioid-addicted offenders. 34 Unlike
traditional drug courts, the so-called “opioid courts” embrace MAT as a
necessary tool in battling addiction and provide immediate access to it, as
well as a host of other “wrap-around” services, such as mental health and
family counseling, sober housing, transportation, and job training. 35 The first
such court was spearheaded in 2017 by Judge Craig D. Hannah in Buffalo
in response to the alarming increase in fentanyl-related deaths gripping his
city. 36 For certain individuals, waiting for MAT meant certain death before
treatment was available. Hannah’s court, like others that adopted its model,
provides immediate treatment to those at risk of overdose, 37 followed by
intensive monitoring by the judge for months thereafter to foster long-term
sobriety. 38
While opioid courts are too new to assess their long-term
effectiveness in managing addiction, early results have been promising in
reducing mortality. 39 Still, there is disagreement about whether the creation
of additional specialty courts is the best approach to manage the opioid
See generally David Lucas & Aaron Arnold, Court Responses to the Opioid Epidemic:
Happening
Now,
CTR.
FOR
CT.
INNOVATION
(July
2019),

34

https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/
media/documents/201907/handout_happeningnow_pageview_07112019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X8DR-4XJE].
The Center for Court Innovation has identified ten core practices guiding opioid courts:
(1) broad legal eligibility; (2) immediate screening for risk of overdose; (3) informed consent
after consultation with defense counsel; (4) suspension of prosecution or expedited plea; (5)
rapid clinical assessment and treatment engagement; (6) recovery support services; (7)
frequent judicial supervision and compliance monitoring; (8) intensive case management; (9)
program completion and continuing care; and (10) performance evaluation and program
improvement. Aaron Arnold et. al., The 10 Essential Elements of Opioid Intervention
Courts, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 3–6 (2019).
See Eric Westervelt, To Save Opioid Addicts, This Experimental Court is Ditching the
Delays,
NPR
(Oct.
5,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2017/10/05/553830794/to-save-opioid-addicts-this-experimental-court-is-ditching-thedelays [https://perma.cc/Y8KD-P6MS].
See Liane Jackson, Opioids, Justice & Mercy: Courts are on the Front Lines of a Lethal
Crisis, 104 ABA J. 36, 39 (2018) (showing that participants are linked with MAT and other
services “within hours of their arrest”).
See Lucas & Arnold, supra note 34 (describing the rules and procedures governing opioid
intervention courts across the country).
See, e.g., Grace Lazzara, Do Opioid Intervention Courts Work? UB Study Will Provide
the
Answer,
UNIV.
AT
BUFF.
(Oct.
30,
2019),
http://www.buffalo.edu/news/releases/2019/10/051.html [https://perma.cc/B9AF-XLAA]
(reporting fewer opioid-related deaths in Erie County following the creation of opioid court
there); Joe Ducey, Cumberland County Opioid Intervention Court Marks Two Years of
Saving
Lives,
LOC.
CBS
21
NEWS
(Feb.
26,
2020),
https://local21news.com/news/local/cumberland-county-opioid-intervention-court-markstwo-years-of-saving-lives [https://perma.cc/SSG7-SY7J] (finding opioid-related deaths down
more than fifty percent in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania in last two years).
35

36

37

38

39
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crisis. In Connecticut, a statewide task force rejected establishing opioid
intervention courts for three main reasons: cost; insufficient evidence of
superiority to existing programs; and the potential for inequity since not all
judicial districts could offer this alternative. 40
Concerns about racial equality are also important in this context.
Drug courts have historically suffered from disproportionate success rates
between white participants and those of color, especially African
Americans. 41 That reality, combined with the disproportionately “white
face” of the opioid epidemic, 42 raises troubling questions about creating
opioid courts. The “war on drugs” fueled by the crack cocaine epidemic of
the 1980s did not give rise to specialized courts; instead, criminal penalties
were increased, which resulted, and continues to result, in mass
incarceration targeting communities of color. 43 Against this backdrop, the
adoption of alternative, less punitive judicial tribunals and procedures to
battle addiction for an overwhelmingly White population is problematic. 44
IV.

DRUG COURT ALTERNATIVES IN MANAGING OPIOIDADDICTED OFFENDERS

In addition to the foregoing, there is a more fundamental problem
with relying on a criminal justice model to manage addicted offenders. For
this population, crime is a byproduct of an underlying and pernicious illness.
Although OUD is diagnosable and treatable, prosecution (or the threat
thereof) is routinely used against those who suffer from it. Other medical
ST. OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH, TASK FORCE TO STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING
OPIOID INTERVENTION COURTS 22 (2019), https://www.jud.ct.gov/Comittees/
Opioidtaskforce/OpioidTFReport112918.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ3R-9TYZ].
See, e.g., Timothy Ho, Shannon M. Carey & Anna M. Malsch, Racial and Gender
40

41

Disparities in Treatment Courts: Do They Exist and Is There Anything We Can Do to
Change Them?, 1 J. ADVANCING JUST. 5 (2018); Lisa M. Shannon, Afton Jones, Shondrah
Nash, Jennifer Newell & Connie M. Payne, Examining Racial Disparities in Program
Completion and Post-Program Recidivism Rates: Comparing Caucasian and Non-Caucasian
Treatment Court Participants, 1 J. ADVANCING JUST. 63 (2018).
See Anjali Om, The Opioid Crisis in Black and White: The Role of Race in Our Nation’s
Recent Drug Epidemic, 40 J. PUB. HEALTH e614, e614 (2018) (observing that nearly ninety
42

percent of opioid-addicted individuals are white).
Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and
Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 311, 358 (1997) (detailing that law
enforcement efforts demonized an urban “underclass” considered “dangerous, offensive,
and undesirable”); Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States,
20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 264 (2009) (describing African American neighborhoods as
a particular target, as crack cocaine became “a lightning rod for a complicated and deeprooted set of racial, class, political, social, and moral dynamics”).
See John Kip Cornwell, Opioid Courts and Judicial Management of the Opioid Crisis, 49
SETON HALL L. REV. 997, 1015–18 (2019) [hereinafter Cornwell, Opioid Courts]
(addressing issues of racial inequity in the opioid court context).
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conditions fare far better. As Professor Leo Beletsky pointedly notes: “We
don’t ask local sheriffs how they plan to tackle obesity . . . in their
community, but they’re frequently quoted as experts on [substance abuse]
because addiction occupies this dueling category of crime and illness.” 45
The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) defines addiction
as “a chronic, relapsing disorder characterized by compulsive drug seeking
and use despite adverse consequences.” 46 NIDA further classifies addiction
as “a brain disorder, because it involves functional changes to brain circuits
involved in reward, stress, and self-control.” 47 The National Judicial Opioid
Task Force concurs, emphasizing that addiction is “not the result of a lack
of a strong will” but rather an affliction that “caus[es] physical changes to
areas of the brain that are critical to judgment, decision making, learning,
memory, and behavior.” 48
This “brain disease model” of addiction has been challenged in
recent years by commentators who, fearing its potentially stigmatizing effect,
favor more of a “biological model,” which defines addiction as “a chronic,
relapsing, biopsychosocial disorder that cannot be understood apart from
social context.” 49 Critics of the brain disease model also point to the success
that incentivizing abstinence has had for various drug users; a result found
difficult to reconcile with the concept of uncontrollable craving and seeking
behavior based on neurological impairment. 50
Disagreements over the precise definition of addiction are less
Molly Callahan, Opioid Addiction Is a Public Health Crisis. The Way We’re Talking
It
Isn’t
Helping,
NEWS@NORTHEASTERN
(Jan.
18,
2019),
https://news.northeastern.edu/2019/01/18/opioid-addiction-is-a-public-health-crisis-the-waywere-talking-about-it-isnt-helping/ [https://perma.cc/E78N-TXQF].
Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction, NAT. INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugs-brains-behavior-science-addiction/drugmisuse-addiction [https://perma.cc/HM8U-ADQ4].
45

About
46

47

Id.

NAT. JUD. OPIOID TASK FORCE, CONVENING, COLLABORATING, CONNECTING: COURTS
LEADERS IN THE CRISIS OF ADDICTION, 32 n.16 (2019) (“It is important that judges
understand that addiction is ‘a chronic, a relapsing brain disease’ and not the result of a lack
of strong will. A host of factors contribute to someone becoming addicted to a substance, but
the bottom line is that it disrupts the normal functioning of a previously healthy brain, causing
physical changes to areas of the brain that are critical to judgment, decision making, learning,
memory, and behavior.”).
Rachel Hammer, Molly Dingel, Jenny Ostergren, Brad Partridge, Jennifer McCormick &
Barbara A. Koenig, Addiction: Current Criticism of the Brain Disease Paradigm, 4 AM. J.
BIOETHICS NEUROSCIENCE 27, 31 (2013); Daniel Z. Buchman, Wayne Skinner & Judy Illes,
Negotiating the Relationship Between Addiction, Ethics, and Brain Science, 1 AM. J.
BIOETHICS NEUROSCIENCE 36, 37 (2010) (“We argue therefore for a biopsychosocial
systems model of, and approach to, addiction in which psychological and sociological factors
complement and are in a dynamic interplay with neurobiological and genetic factors.”).
See Peter Reuter, Why Has U.S. Drug Policy Changed So Little Over 30 Years?, 42 CRIME
& JUST. 75, 109–10 (2013).
48
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49

50
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important than the core principle on which there is broad consensus: that
substance abuse disorder generally, and opioid use disorder specifically, are
biologically based illnesses that impair an individual’s ability to participate
productively in daily life. Then, if those suffering from OUD have a
disabling illness that relates directly to their criminal misconduct, one has to
wonder why jurisdictions assign these cases to drug courts where judges
often reject providing the very treatment these individuals need to overcome
their illness? 51 Why not transfer the management of opioid-addicted
offenders to mental health courts, whose primary focus is to address the
mental illness that drives the criminality? The next section explores this
question.

A.

Mental Health Courts

Like drug courts, mental health courts are “problem-solving”
courts—that is, courts that “attempt[] to address the root causes of criminal
or otherwise undesirable behavior by promoting a program of behavioral
reform.” 52 Mental health courts emerged in the 1990s in response to two
converging forces. First, U.S. Supreme Court decisions and advances in
psychiatric practice led to the “de-institutionalization” of mental health
care. 53 Once treated in residential treatment programs, the severely mentally
ill were released into the community to receive necessary treatment. 54
Second, Reagan-era budget cuts reduced the funding for community
treatment programs while reducing Social Security disability benefits for
mentally disabled persons. 55 When these two events coalesced, hundreds of
thousands of formerly hospitalized persons with mental illness were
deposited into the community without adequate access to treatment and
often without essentials such as food and housing. 56 This combination of
poverty and mental illness led to the arrest of countless individuals; by 2006,
the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that roughly half of all individuals
incarcerated in state prisons and local jails suffered from serious mental
51
52

See supra text accompanying notes 28–33.
David Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1473, 1505

(2014).
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 22–29 (2012) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Past and Future] (discussing due
process case law relevant to deinstitutionalization); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass
Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 65–68 (2011).
See Harcourt, supra note 53.
See Bagenstos, Past and Future, supra note 53, at 20–21; Michael L. Perlin, Competency,
Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV 63,
78–79 (1991).
See Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community”, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 343, 363–68 (2003).
53

54
55

56
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disorders. 57
The “criminalization” of mental illness inspired the creation of the
country’s first mental health court in Broward County, Florida, in 1997, with
Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren presiding. 58 These specialized courts
proliferated in the years that followed and are now in excess of 300 in fortytwo states. 59 Unlike drug courts, treatment is front and center in mental
health courts, turning courtrooms at times into something more akin to
group therapy sessions. 60 Law enforcement officials take part in the
proceedings but, unlike in other courts, these officials have mental health
training and work cooperatively with other team members to foster a
therapeutic, non-adversarial atmosphere. 61 As Lerner-Wren notes, a mental
health court’s “primary objectives include absolute diversion, humane
treatment, and a trauma informed recovery model which honors choice and
is client-centered.” 62
These principles articulated by Lerner-Wren underscore the
organizing philosophy of mental health courts: “therapeutic jurisprudence.”
Therapeutic jurisprudence posits that laws are a social force 63 that “should
be used to promote mental health and psychological functioning.” 64 As such,
therapeutic jurisprudence invites robust scrutiny of laws to assess their
therapeutic and anti-therapeutic effects. 65 As David Wexler, one of the
movement’s founders, noted, the decision as to whether therapeutic
objectives should prevail is a normative question that must take account of
other relevant considerations. However, “other things being equal, the law
Fifty-four percent of jail inmates and 43% of state prisoners showed symptoms of mania.
For major depression, the percentages were 30% and 23%, respectively and, for psychotic
disorders, 24% and 15%. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MENTAL
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006).
See E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 529,
n.54 (2012).
SUZANNE M. STRONG, RAMONA R. RANTALA & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST.,
CENSUS
OF
PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS
1,
3–4
(2012),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpscl2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EZ3-GDUW].
See Developments in the Law—The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV 1114, 1172
(2008).
See Justin L. Joffe, Don’t Call Me Crazy: A Survey of America’s Mental Health System, 91
CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 1145, 1163–64 (2016).
Hon. Ginger Lerner-Wren, Mental Health Courts: Serving Justice and Promoting
Recovery, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 577, 589 (2010).
See David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
125, 125 (2000).
Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y
& L. 184, 191 (1997).
See David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17,
22 (2008); Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1
PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y & L. 193, 193–94 (1995) [hereinafter Slobogin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence].
57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

2021]

THE SEARCH FOR ANSWERS

431

should be restructured to better accomplish therapeutic values.” 66
Therapeutic jurisprudence scholars believe that identifying laws’
therapeutic value vel non must look to social science research and theory
for answers. 67 While ostensibly an effort to provide a solid, analytical
foundation to guide decision-makers, this quest for data can prove elusive.
First, there are limits, both legal and ethical, concerning researchers’ ability
to conduct scientifically rigorous studies with human subjects in the mental
health arena. 68 In addition, experimental bias, informed by the values
researchers bring to a study, can influence the conclusions drawn from the
data. 69 To illustrate how researchers’ value judgments can impact their
conclusions, Christopher Slobogin points to two studies analyzing the
therapeutic implications of civil commitment hearings for juveniles that
produced contrary findings based on the same variables. 70 Slobogin posits
that the dissonance flows not from the characterization of data but rather
from differences in perspective on the commitment process, based on the
researchers’ observations and experiences over many years of working in
this field. 71 In sum, the social-science data relied upon by therapeutic
jurisprudence “may be unusually uncertain.” 72
David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
27, 32 (1992) (emphasis omitted); see also Winick, supra note 64, at 206 (describing that
Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence’s co-founder, has likewise commented that other
normative values in addition to physical and psychological health may be relevant with
respect to a given law or legal standard). When these aims conflict, the discord sharpens but
does not resolve the debate. Conversely, where “therapeutic and other normative values
converge, therapeutic jurisprudence helps to identify the path of true law reform.” Id.
See, e.g., Winick, supra note 64, at 195–96.
See Christopher Slobogin, Treatment of the Mentally Disabled: Rethinking the
Community-First Idea, 69 NEB. L. Rev. 413, 424 (1990) (considering a theoretical study that
endeavors to evaluate the effectiveness of community treatment programs for individuals
with serious mental disabilities. To maximize scientific reliability, those meeting commitment
criteria should be randomly assigned to either the hospital or the community treatment
program, with a third receiving no treatment at all. While scientifically optimal, releasing
imminently dangerous persons is untenable).
See, e.g., David Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science
to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1026–39 (1989) (discussing
researcher bias); Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal
Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 126–39
(rejecting custody research because of its male bias); Michael Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of
Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1038 (1994) (addressing problems
of external validity).
Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 65, at 206.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 208, 218 (notwithstanding his criticisms, Slobogin remains sympathetic towards the
therapeutic jurisprudence “agenda,” while cautioning awareness of the shortcomings of social
science research and advocating, in response, that hypotheses about the therapeutic value of
a law or legal practice be broken into as many testable subparts as possible to promote
validity).
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That said, data with respect to the treatment of opioid abuse suffers
no such uncertainty. There is widespread agreement in the scientific
community that MAT is a critical—and effective—component in recovery
from OUD. 73 In fact, the evidence about the efficacy of MAT is so
compelling that, as of 2015, drug courts that receive federal funding through
the Adult Drug Court Discretionary Grant program can no longer reject
participants based solely on their use of these medications. 74 This might
seem like a game-changer for the ability of individuals with OUD to access
MAT through drug courts. Unfortunately, certain factors blunt the force of
the policy.
First, most drug courts do not receive federal funding. According
to the Congressional Research Service, among the roughly 3,000 drug courts
in the United States, only about 200 received federal money. 75 Second, for
the vast majority that do not receive federal funding, the National Drug
Court Institute instructs its judges to determine whether MAT is appropriate
where the prosecutor challenges its use as medically unnecessary or
contraindicated. 76 In combination, these limitations have stalled
revolutionary change in drug court practice regarding MAT. 77
The availability of MAT is not the only benefit of using mental
health courts to manage opioid abusers. As discussed earlier, it is important
to remember that OUD is a mental disorder under the DSM-5. 78 Also,
roughly half of those who suffer from substance abuse disorders have a co-

WORLD HEALTH ORG., W.H.O. MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 1, 32 (18th ed.
2013),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/93142/EML_18_eng.pdf;jsessionid=92F7
99664564C4058B7D64948CA24168?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/5LSA-BFAH]; OFF.
OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: OPIOID
ABUSE IN THE U.S. AND H.H.S. ACTIONS TO ADDRESS OPIOID-RELATED OVERDOSES AND
DEATHS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 26, 2015),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/opioid-abuse-us-and-hhs-actions-address-opioid-drugrelated-overdoses-and-deaths [https://perma.cc/KQZ5-VKFP]. See generally ANDREJ
KASTELIC, JÖRG PONT & HEINO STÖVER, OPIOID SUBSTITUTION TREATMENT IN
CUSTODIAL SETTINGS A PRACTICAL GUIDE (Fabienne Hariga et al. eds., 2008),
http://www.unodc.org/documents/hiv-aids/OST_in_Custodial_Settings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7RTA-3LNN]. See also Substance Abuse and Mental Health Servs.
Admin., Medication-Assisted Treatment, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment [https://perma.cc/Q5T4-ZXFU].
See Benjamin R. Nordstrom & Douglas B. Marlowe, Medication-Assisted Treatment for
Opioid-Use Disorders in Drug Courts, 11 NAT’L DRUG CT. INST. 1, 5 (2016).
See SACCO, supra note 11, at 4, 8.
Nordstrom & Marlowe, supra note 74, at 6.
See supra text accompanying notes 30–31 (discussing reluctance of drug court judges to
embrace MAT).
See supra text accompanying notes 7–10.
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75
76
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occurring mental health disorder, 79 which, in most cases, is not causally
related to the addiction. 80 The prevalence of this co-morbidity underscores
the propriety of assigning OUD cases to courts that can address mental
health issues holistically and in a manner that maximizes therapeutic value. 81

B.

The Disability Rights Perspective

As the foregoing illustrates, our present opioid epidemic sparked a
wealth of commentary from the criminal justice and mental health
communities. By contrast, OUD received relatively little attention from
disability rights advocates. This apparent disinterest may result, at least in
part, from the challenges that exist in fitting substance abuse within the
existing disability rights framework. The insights offered by disability rights
theory, however, are worth considering in determining best practices.
That addiction qualifies as a disability is without question. Apart
from its inclusion in the DSM-5, the federal American with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA) 82 has long recognized addiction as a disabling illness. 83
Accordingly, to make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination,
a plaintiff would need to show that his addiction “substantially limits one or
more major life activities;” 84 that he has “a record of such an impairment;”
or is “regarded as having such an impairment.” 85 Moreover, under
amendments to the ADA passed in 2008, an individual who suffers an
See Katherine E. Watkins, Audrey Burnam, Fuan-Yue Kung & Susan Paddock, A National
Survey of Care for Persons with Co-Occurring Mental and Substance Use Disorders, 52

79

PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1062, 1062 (2001); Ronald C. Kessler, Christopher Neslson, Katherine
A. McGonagle, Mark J. Edulund, Richard G. Frank & Philip J. Leaf, The Epidemiology of

Co-Occurring Addictive and Mental Disorders: Implications for Prevention and Service
Utilization, 66 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 17, 25 (1996) (noting that fifty-one percent of

individuals with a lifetime addictive disorder also had a lifetime mental disorder).
Watkins et al., supra note 79, at 1062; see also Nora D. Volkow, What Do We Know
About Drug Addiction?, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1401, 1401 (2005).
See generally Sara Gordon, About a Revolution: Towards Integrated Treatment in Drug
and Mental Health Courts, 97 N.C. L. REV. 355 (2019) (advocating for integrating drug,
alcohol, and mental health courts to provide comprehensive treatment addressing
participants’ diverse mental health needs. While she persuasively describes the troubling lack
of justificatory consistency in the assignment of individuals to one specialty court versus
another, this consolidation would be a massive undertaking, to say the least).
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2008)).
See Amy L. Hennen, Protecting Addicts in the Employment Arena: Charting a Course
Towards Tolerance, 15 L. & INEQ. 157, 167–68 (1997) (ADA recognizes addiction as a
disabling disease covered by the Act).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); see also id. § 12102(2)(A) (“[M]ajor life activities include, but are
not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating,
thinking, communicating, and working.”).
Id. § 12102(1)(B)–(C).
80

81
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adverse employment decision because he is “regarded as” being an addict
has experienced disability discrimination whether or not his addiction limits,
or is believed to limit, a major life activity. 86 While addiction is a protected
disability, there is no protection where an addict uses illegal drugs or
unlawfully uses or obtains controlled substances. 87
While substance abuse disorders like OUD clearly qualify as a
disability, there is very little mention of these disorders in disability rights
literature. This omission is likely the result of the unique place these
illnesses occupy in the disability landscape and the resultant difficulty
reconciling them with prevailing theories relied upon by advocates working
in this space. To understand this challenge, we must begin with the two
competing models of disability: medical and social.
The “medical model” is the original, historically dominant
paradigm of disability in the United States. 88 It labels individuals as disabled
if they suffer from a biological impairment that significantly limits their
functional ability. 89 Accordingly, overcoming this incapacity requires
rehabilitation “to ameliorate the consequences of their disability” so that
they may align, as closely as possible, with the societal standard of
normalcy. 90 Because the medical model views disability as a biologicallybased abnormality, it fosters dependence on doctors and rehabilitation
professionals; in short, it gives the medical profession “cognitive authority”
See Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.2d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 110-730,
pt. 1, at 14 (2008)).
See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 890 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C § 12210(a))
(“For purposes of this Act, the term ‘individual with a disability’ does not include an
individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts
on the basis of such use.”); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6) (mandating that drug use that violates the
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812, is considered illegal drug use for the purpose
of the ADA); 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3) (“[T]o acquire or obtain possession of a controlled
substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge.”). An individual
receiving MAT does not run afoul of this prohibition; however, he may be denied
employment if he poses a “direct threat” to his own health or safety or that of others by virtue
of his lawful opioid use. See EEOC v. Hussey Cooper Ltd., 696 F. Supp. 2d 505, 519 (W.D.
Pa. 2010). See generally Sarah Ferraro, Finding the Positive in a Positive Drug Test: How
86

87

Narrowing the Definition of an Individualized Pre-Employment Assessment under the ADA
Can Encourage Recovery from Opioid Dependence, 2 BELMONT HEALTH L.J. 1, 4–5

(2019) (“An individual is not qualified for ADA protection when, if hired, he or she would
pose a direct threat to health or safety in the workplace that could not be remedied through
a reasonable accommodation.”).
See Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of the
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 186 (2008).
See Kevin Barry, Gray Matters: Autism, Impairment, and the End of Binaries, 49 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 161, 193 (2012).
Eric Shyman, The Reinforcement of Ableism: Normality, the Medical Model of Disability,
and Humanism in Applied Behavior Analysis and ASD, 54 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 366, 368 (2016); see also Barry, supra note 89, at 201.
88

89

90
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to intervene. 91
The “social model” emerged in response to concerns about the
troubling implications of the medical model. First and foremost, disability
advocates assailed the medical model’s disregard of society’s role in creating
disability through social exclusion 92—that is, by erecting barriers and
purposefully discriminating against those with physical or mental
impairments. 93 Most social model adherents do not deny there is a biological
component to disability; 94 however, they differentiate individuals’ ostensible
physical or mental “impairment” from their socially constructed
“disablement.” By creating this “disability binary,” 95 the social model
reconceptualizes disability as the interaction between a physical or mental
impairment “and contingent aspects of our environment that restrict
accessibility or limit functioning.” 96
The medical model’s influence has largely receded in recent years,
as the disability rights movement enthusiastically embraced the social
model. 97 This near-universal acceptance reflects widespread concern over
Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649–51 (1999);
see also SAMUEL BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
91

MOVEMENT 6–7 (Yale U. Press 2009) [hereinafter BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE
CONTRADICTIONS].
See Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, THE DISABILITY STUD. READER
214–15 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 3d ed. 2010).
Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1251, 1261 (2007) (arguing that the social model defines disability as everything that restricts
people with impairments “ranging from individual prejudice to institutional discrimination,
from inaccessible public buildings to unusable transport systems, from segregated education
to excluding work arrangements, and so on”).
See Bradley Areheart, Disability Trouble, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 354 (2011); Barry,
supra note 89, at 199. But see MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM
THEORY TO PRACTICE 32–33, 35 (2d ed., Red Globe Press 2009) (suggesting that all
disability is socially constructed, meaning nothing can be viewed as disabling without an
adverse social setting).
See MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 35
(2d ed., Palgrave Macmillan 1990) (maintaining that “disablement” represents the disability’s
social construction whereas “impairment” references its physiological or biological
dimension).
Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A New Universality for Disability
Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 943 (2012); see also Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability
92

93

94

95

96

Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do
About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 100 (2000) (describing the social model’s

understanding that “actual limitations that flow from an individual’s physical or mental
impairment often result from the manner in which society itself is structured”).
See BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 91, at 13; Vlad Perju,
97

Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction of Disability in the European
Union and the United States, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279, 281 (2011) (recognizing that the

social model obtained international consensus in the 2007 U.N. Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities).
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the paternalism, 98 custodialism, 99 and biological determinism associated with
the medical model. 100
These attributes collectively painted a picture of disabled
individuals as “unfortunate victims” whom society needed to “fix” to allow
them to navigate daily life. 101 By disaggregating impairment and disablement,
the social model refocuses causal responsibility for disablement away from
specific physical or mental traits and onto the “architectural, social, and
economic environment” that renders those traits disabling. 102 The
ascendancy of the social model is undoubtedly a positive development in
changing public opinion vis-à-vis persons with disabilities. For example, for
wheelchair-dependent individuals, it refocuses attention away from their
physical handicap and towards society’s role in creating disability by making
buildings inaccessible and thereby highlighting their restricted mobility.
Likewise, treating individuals with bipolar disorder in an institutional setting
connotes an inability to function in mainstream society; accommodation in
the workplace, by contrast, underscores the falsity of that perception and
helps, over time, to reshape negative public opinion.
Unfortunately, OUD fits far less comfortably within the social
model than other disabilities. It is fundamentally a biologically driven
disease that is inherently life-threatening, requiring immediate, evidencebased medical intervention. Other individuals with a mental illness may be
fully functional in mainstream settings, 103 which is far less true of those in the
throes of opioid abuse. 104 In many respects, OUD seems to embody the

See Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1963, 1985
(2013) (discussing the rejection of paternalism that is inherent in the move away from the
medical model of disability); Perju, supra note 97, at 289.
Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 899 (“Custodialism is the idea that persons with disabilities are to
be sheltered—that they should be kept separate from the population at large and given charity
to compensate for their inability to survive in the world.”); Crossley, supra note 91, at 651–
52; Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL.
L. REV. 809, 816 (1966).
See Areheart, supra note 94, at 350 n.8 (noting biological determinism is “the idea that our
genetic makeup determines and makes inevitable our development as people with certain
traits and opportunities”).
See Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality and Identity, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1049–50
(2004).
Samaha, supra note 93, at 1255; Travis, supra note 96, at 944.
See Ramona L. Paetzold, How Courts, Employers and the ADA Disable Persons with
Bipolar Disorder, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 293, 316 (2005) (noting that people with
bipolar disorder can function more effectively in the workplace when experiencing mania
due to the unusual energy and motivation that occurs during such episodes).
Can Use of Prescription Opioids Lead to Addiction?, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (May
2020),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/prescription-opioids
[https://perma.cc/3DE9-TSMC] (acknowledging that continued abuse and misuse of opioids
98
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100
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medical model perfectly: it is not “socially constructed;” 105 it is instead an
affliction for which hope for recovery rests squarely in “compliance with
medical treatment, rehabilitation, and adaptation.” 106 Criticizing the medical
model, Professor Lisa Eichhorn noted that it “turned disabled people into
patients,” requiring them to submit to treatment as a condition of societal
participation, “even if they had already found their own ways to function
effectively.” 107 But that is the point: in a post-fentanyl world, opioid abusers,
if they survive at all, cannot function effectively long-term without medical
intervention.
In addition to OUD’s suitability to the disfavored medical model,
there is the further question of how society should structure the evidencebased treatment for those who need it. The disability rights community has
long debated the relative merits and detriments of two competing
philosophies: integration and anti-subordination.
Integrationists warn that treating disabled individuals in isolated,
“special” settings disincentivizes changing mainstream environments to
support them. 108 Anti-subordination advocates counter that separation
creates inequality only if it is “invidious,” and the provision of “adequate
services and positive recognition” eliminates this potential. 109 Antisubordination advocates’ focus is on empowering persons with disabilities
to overcome disadvantage, with or without integration. 110
The difference between the two positions is, to some extent,
theoretical. On a practical level, advocates of the two positions agree that
the focus should be on the individual’s best interests, which may or may not
suggest treatment in an integrated setting. 111 This distinction is especially
relevant in certain contexts, most notably educational services for children

causes neurologic change, health problems, “and failure to meet responsibilities at work,
school or home”).
Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J. S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS
L.J. 1203, 1209 (2007) (referencing the tenet of the social model that individuals’ “functional
limitations are caused by the socially constructed environment”).
Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of
Disability in Anti-Discrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6–7 (1999); see also
Crossley, supra note 91, at 650.
Lisa Eichhorn, Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: The Limits of the
Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 U. WASH. L. REV. 575, 596 (2002).
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Abolish the Integration Presumption? Not Yet, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 157, 162 (2007) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Abolish].
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1415, 1420 (2007).
See id. at 1448 (arguing that quality of life measures should be indicators of progress instead
of advances in societal integration).
See Weber, supra note 99, at 919; Bagenstos, Abolish, supra note 108, at 159.
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with special needs. 112 Its relevance for individuals with OUD sounds
principally in the forum used to manage their criminal offending and
treatment needs.
The “integration presumption” that has permeated disability law
would seem to mediate against the creation of specialized opioid courts that
silo OUD sufferers entirely. 113 Drug and mental health courts do this to a
lesser extent since individuals with OUD represent only part of their overall
population. Moreover, both seem infinitely preferable to traditional
criminal courts, which, while highly integrated, are too adversarial and
punishment-oriented to provide the therapeutic environment necessary to
promote recovery.
It is important to remember, in this regard, that the integration
presumption is not absolute. The ADA clarifies that courts must provide
services to persons with disabilities only in the most integrated setting that is
“appropriate” to their needs. 114 Drug and mental health courts presumably
satisfy this standard by including necessary treatment personnel unavailable
in other criminal tribunals. Since opioid courts do much the same thing,
they would overcome the integration presumption if available evidence
showed that more integrated settings would not adequately meet OUD
offenders’ needs. As Professor Ruth Colker noted, “the concept that
‘separate is inherently unequal’ has outlived its usefulness in the disability
context” and should make room for the delivery of separate services “that
are not premised on an intention to demean and degrade.” 115
The emergence of opioid courts does not run afoul of Colker’s
prescription. Far from casting aspersions on individuals with OUD, the
motivation for their creation has been, simply put, to save lives. Judge Craig
Hannah wants individuals appearing before him “to have another sunset,
another time with their family, to see another Christmas.” 116 The
inconsistency in treatment that plagues drug courts, 117 coupled with the
See Alan Gartner, What to Do with Difference: The ADA, Special Education and
Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 555, 562–63 (2001); Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration
Presumption, Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789, 825–35 (2006).
Bagenstos, Abolish, supra note 108, at 157 (positing that the integration presumption has
112

113

gained “near-consensus status” in the disability rights community and acknowledging that
through this presumption, advocates aim to ensure that “people with disabilities are fully
integrated into the nation’s economic and civil life”).
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2012).
Colker, supra note 112, at 1422.
Eric Westervelt, To Save Opioid Addicts, This Experimental Court Is Ditching the Delays,
NPR
(Oct.
5,
2017,
5:02
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2017/10/05/553830794/to-save-opioid-addicts-this-experimental-court-is-ditching-thedelays [https://perma.cc/C79Z-D2BL].
See Kimberly Baker, Decision Making in a Hybrid Organization: A Case Study of a
Southwestern Treatment Program, 38 L. & SOC. INQ. 27, 39 (2013) (describing an “eclectic”
array of treatment modalities used in drug courts, the lack of uniformity in approach across
114
115
116

117
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widespread lack of availability of MAT, 118 has robbed OUD sufferers of this
opportunity all too often. 119

C.

Involuntary Psychiatric Commitment

While creating specialized courts for individuals with OUD
challenges integrationist principles, it does so far less egregiously than
another alternative available in most jurisdictions: involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization. States commonly allow involuntary civil commitment to a
mental health hospital based on clear and convincing evidence that an
individual is mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or others. 120 Thirtyseven states and the District of Columbia include substance use disorders in
their statutory commitment standard, either under the umbrella of mental
illness or through a separate provision. 121 However, until as recently as 2015,
many states made little or no use of these mechanisms to secure the
commitment of substance abusers. 122 The opioid epidemic, however, has
changed this landscape.
While controversial as a matter of public policy, there is little doubt
that states have the federal constitutional authority to commit opioid abusers
involuntarily. In Kansas v. Hendricks, 123 which addressed a state statute
authorizing the civil commitment of sexually violent predators, the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that his confinement based
on “mental abnormality” violated substantive due process. 124 It did not
matter that this terminology did not correspond to a recognized psychiatric
diagnosis since “the term ‘mental illness’ is devoid of any talismanic

courts, and the reluctance of drug court judges to allow scrutiny of their practices from
outsiders).
See supra text accompanying notes 28–33.
See, e.g., Christine Mehta, Neither Justice nor Treatment: Drug Courts in the United
States, PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS. (June 15, 2017), https://phr.org/ourwork/resources/niether-justice-nor-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/B8YS-HQ6H] (opining that
drug courts promote “overly-punitive, dysfunctional drug policies that are harmful to health
and human life”).
See generally Richard C. Boldt, Emergency Detention and Involuntary Hospitalization:
Assessing the Front End of the Civil Commitment Process, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 1 (2017)
(reviewing various state laws for involuntary civil commitment).
NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR MODEL ST. DRUG LAWS, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT FOR
INDIVIDUALS WITH A SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER OR ALCOHOLISM 3 (2016),
https://www.mass.gov/doc/namsdl-involuntary-commitment-for-individuals-with-asubstance-use-disorder-or-alcoholism/download [https://perma.cc/9W8M-MCMV].
See Involuntary Commitment for Substance Use Disorders, HAZELDON BETTY FORD
FOUND.
(2017),
https://www.hazeldenbettyford.org/education/bcr/addictionresearch/involuntary-commitment-edt-717 [https://perma.cc/CE6S-JN6C].
521 U.S. 346 (1997).
Id. at 356.
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significance.” 125 Mental impairments justify involuntary civil detention where
they reflect “a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond
their control.” 126
The breadth of the “mental illness” requirement for psychiatric
commitment extends in equal measure to dangerousness. 127 Under its
parens patriae power, a state can detain a mentally disordered person who
is a danger to himself or “gravely disabled.” 128 Accordingly, some
jurisdictions have proposed legislation specific to opioids that rely on states’
paternalistic authority over persons in need of supportive services. For
example, New Hampshire, whose civil commitment statute excludes
substance abusers, has proposed an amendment that would include any
person who has “ingested opioid substances” and, as a result, “lacks the
capacity to care for his or her own welfare,” producing “a likelihood of
death, serious bodily injury, or serious debilitation.” 129 Other proposals have
gone even further. A bill introduced in the Washington State Senate would
deem persons with OUD “gravely disabled” based on their active use of
heroin coupled with, inter alia, “three or more visible track marks indicating
intravenous drug use” in the previous twelve months. 130 By contrast,
Id. at 359.
Id. at 358; see generally John Kip Cornwell, Understanding the Role of the Police and
Parens Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil Commitment Before and After Hendricks, 4

125
126

PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 377 (1998).
Dangerousness predictions in this context, moreover, have been historically inaccurate,
with studies reporting a success rate of less than fifty percent. See Mara Lynn Krongard, A
Population at Risk: Civil Commitment of Substance Abusers After Kansas v. Hendricks, 90
CAL. L. REV. 111, 149 (2002).
This “therapeutic” justification for commitment of individuals for their own health and
well-being traces back to the nineteenth century where, In re Oakes, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court vindicated civil commitment as “necessary for [the petitioner’s] restoration.”
8 L. REP. 122, 125 (1845); see also Bruce A. Arrigo, Paternalism, Civil Commitment and
Illness Politics: Assessing the Current Debate and Outlining a Future Direction, 7 J.L. &
HEALTH 131, 137 (1992) (referencing Oakes’ role in establishing courts’ parens patriae
jurisdiction “in matters pertaining to the protection of the psychiatrically disordered”);
Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190,
1209 (1974) (tracing the “parens patriae power to detain the mentally ill to facilitate their
rehabilitation” to Oakes).
S.B.
220-FN,
2017
Sess.
(N.H.
2017),
http://gencourt.state.nh.us/bill_status/billText.aspx?sy=2017&id=859&txtFormat=html
[https://perma.cc/8TEM-YXNU]. The Bill has not been enacted. See GOV’T COMM’N, ST.
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, LITERATURE REVIEW: INVOLUNTARY EMERGENCY ADMIT FOR
INDIVIDUALS
WITH
SUBSTANCE
USE
DISORDER
(2019),
http://1viuw040k2mx3a7mwz1lwva5-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/SUD-lit-review-Gov-Commission-FINAL-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5V9M-HZQS].
S.B.
5811,
65th
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Wash.
2017),
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2017-18/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5811.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ASN9-TJZU].
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legislators in West Virginia, 131 and Maryland, 132 have proposed linking
involuntary commitment to drug overdoses.
The fact that none of these opioid-specific initiatives has become
law is not surprising. First, they have met opposition from public interest
groups. The ACLU of Maryland, for example, assailed that state’s proposal
as “unconstitutional, extremely costly, and unnecessary to protect society
against substance use disorder.” 133 The Maryland Psychiatric Society also
opposed the Maryland bill, noting its withdrawal “after a somewhat rocky
hearing” before the House committee where the ACLU testified. 134 New
Hampshire lawmakers have also expressed concern about opioid-based
modifications to its civil commitment statute, highlighting the need to
establish safeguards for patients’ rights and address aftercare once OUD
sufferers are released from confinement. 135
Second, where individuals addicted to opioids have been
involuntarily committed, the results were inconclusive at best. A major
impediment in assessing efficacy with any degree of certainty is, first and
foremost, the paucity of reliable data. 136 One of the few studies addressing
the civil commitment of opioid abusers found longer periods of sobriety
after release based on two factors: experiencing greater “procedural justice”
during the commitment process and receiving “post-commitment
medication treatment.” 137 In a follow-up study this year, these same
researchers compared the perspectives on the civil commitment of those
confined for opioid drug abuse versus mental illness. While overall, the
OUD cohort supported civil commitment on both bases, they were more
supportive of commitment based on mental illness. They considered
H.B. 4215, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018). No further action was taken on the Bill
after referral to the House Judiciary Committee.
H.D. 499, 438th Gen. Assemb., Sess. (Md. 2018).
AM. C.L. UNION OF MD., TESTIMONY FOR THE HOUSE HEALTH & GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS COMMITTEE 1 (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.aclu-md.org/sites/default/files/
field_documents/hb_499-_standards_invol_admission.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJA8-GAFH].
See 2018 Session Recap, MD. PSYCHIATRIC SOC., https://mdpsych.org/legislation/sessionrecaps- laws/2018-session-recap/ [https://perma.cc/Q6D4-4GVF].
See Alexander LaCasse, Bill Would Allow ‘Involuntary Commitment’ for Addiction,
SEACOASTONLINE.COM
(Jan.
22,
2017,
2:01
AM),
https://www.seacoastonline.com/news/20170122/bill-would-allow-involuntary-commitmentfor-addiction [https://perma.cc/G2P5-T2TY].
Paul P. Christopher, Debra A. Pinals, Taylor Stayton, Kellie Sanders, & Lester Blumberg,
Nature and Utilization of Civil Commitment for Substance Abuse in the United States, 43 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 313, 319 (2015) (noting that data about outcomes following
civil commitment for substance abuse “are surprisingly limited, outdated, and conflicting”).
Paul P. Christopher, Bradley Anderson & Michael D. Stein, Civil Commitment
Experiences Among Opioid Users, 193 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 137, 141 (2018)
[hereinafter Christopher, DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE] (cautioning that the study had
design limitations that needed to be taken into consideration in relying on its findings).
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involuntary detention less effective if they had been subject to a prior
commitment on this basis. 138 However, Harvard Medical School has offered
a particularly damning assessment of this practice, opining that involuntary
treatment is not only ineffective but also increases long-term overdose risk. 139
According to data compiled in Massachusetts, those subject to involuntary
hospitalization for addiction were twice as likely to overdose as those who
were not. 140 When viewed collectively, the available data is insufficient to
recommend using involuntary psychiatric commitment to address the
opioid crisis.
Involuntary hospitalization is troubling for other reasons, starting
with the commitment process itself, which can resemble a criminal
proceeding to a disturbing degree. For example, in Massachusetts,
individuals subject to commitment hearings are taken into police custody,
detained alongside criminal defendants, and handcuffed or otherwise
restrained both in transit to and from the hearings and during the
proceedings themselves. 141 Unsurprisingly, OUD sufferers often regard this
process as an “unwelcome intervention.” 142 It is also plainly non-therapeutic,
representing a radical departure from the principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence that informed the creation of drug and mental health courts. 143
These concerns over procedural justice, coupled with the lack of
compelling evidence that involuntary residential treatment is effective for
persons with OUD, bring the questionable morality of this practice into
sharp focus. The competence of opioid abusers to make decisions in their
self-interest further complicates this inquiry.
While there is some evidence linking substance abuse to deficits
in impulse control that impair judgment, 144 the impact of long-term

Paul P. Christopher, Bradley Anderson & Michael D. Stein, Comparing Views on Civil
Commitment for Drug Misuse and for Mental Illness Among Persons with Opioid Use
Disorder, 113 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 1, 4–5 (2020).
Leo Beletsky, Elisabeth J. Ryan & Wendy Parmet, Involuntary Treatment for Substance
Abuse Disorder: A Misguided Response to the Opioid Crisis, HARV. HEALTH PUB. (Jan. 25,
138

139

2018), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/involuntary-treatment-sud-misguided-response2018012413180 [https://perma.cc/B79C-K7C5].

140

Id.
See Paul P. Christopher, Paul S. Applebaum & Michael D. Stein, Criminalization of
Opioid Civil Commitment, 77 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 111, 111 (2020).
Christopher, DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE, supra note 137, at 140.
See Michael Perlin, Who Will Judge the Many When the Game Is Through?: Considering
the Profound Differences Between Mental Health Courts and “Traditional” Involuntary
Civil Commitment Courts, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 937, 958–59 (2018).
See, e.g., Xavier Noël, Martial Van Der Linden & Antoine Bechara, The Neurocognitive
Mechanisms of Decision-Making, Impulse Control, and Loss of Willpower to Resist Drugs,
141

142
143

144

3 PSYCHIATRY 30, 30–31 (2006).
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substance abuse on decisional capacity is unclear. 145 Without conclusive
proof that persons with OUD are incapable of making informed decisions,
the government’s moral authority to remove autonomy and coerce
treatment is arguably lacking. 146
V.
COERCION, STIGMA, AND THE
NEED FOR “RESTORATIVE JUSTICE”
In contrast to civil commitment proceedings, problem-solving
courts endeavor to avoid coercion to the maximum extent possible,
something advocates consider critical to their therapeutic mission. 147
Coercion, advocates believe, undermines the dignity and respect that all
individuals deserve and should give way to “positive pressures, such as
persuasion and inducement.” 148 While eliminating all coercion, perceived or
otherwise, is impossible, the team-based approach and informality of these
courts, especially mental health courts, 149 limit its effects dramatically
compared to alternative judicial forums.
Reducing the stigma associated with opioid abuse is another
overarching goal of mental health advocates. While persons with a mental
illness battle negative societal perceptions, the attitudes toward drug
addiction are even worse, with an overwhelming majority reporting they
would not want a person with drug addiction to marry into their family or
work closely with them on the job. 150 For opioids, in particular, most
Americans believe that persons with OUD lack self-discipline and,
therefore, are themselves to blame for the poor choices they make because
of their affliction. 151 Stigma also influences drug court judges’ reluctance to
See Dilip V. Jeste & Elyn Saks, Decisional Capacity in Mental Illness and Substance Abuse
Disorders: Empirical Database and Policy Implications, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 607, 623–24

145

(2006).
See Candice Player, Involuntary Civil Commitment: A Solution to the Opioid Crisis?, 71
RUTGERS L. REV. 589, 630 (2019) (arguing against involuntary civil commitment of persons
with substance use disorders in the absence of a judicial determination of incompetence).
See Perlin, supra note 143, at 956 (highlighting the distinction between the “dark, greased
runways” of civil commitment courts and “coercion-avoiding” mental health courts).
Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 1055, 1077 (2003).
See supra text accompanying notes 60–62.
See Colleen L. Barry, Emma E. McGinty, Bernice A. Pescosolido & Howard H.
Holdman, Stigma, Discrimination, Treatment Effectiveness and Policy Support: Comparing
Public Views about Drug Addiction with Mental Illness, 65 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1269 (2014),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4285770/ [https://perma.cc/T9SC-U7NC].
Perceptions of persons with mental illness were dramatically better in both regards. Id.
See Beth McGinty, Guiding Principles for Addressing the Stigma of Opioid Addiction,
JOHNS
HOPKINS
BLOOMBERG
SCH.
OF
PUB.
HEALTH,
https://americanhealth.jhu.edu/article/guiding-principles-addressing-stigma-opioid-addiction
[https://perma.cc/MWS9-SKPT]; see also Yngvild Olsen & Joshua M. Sharfstein,
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order MAT, for fear that they will be “replacing one addiction with
another.” 152 These public perceptions inevitably impact individuals
struggling with OUD, exacerbating low self-esteem and feelings of
inadequacy. 153
However benevolent drug and mental health courts strive to be,
they cannot escape OUD’s underlying criminalization since they use the
pendency of criminal charges to incentivize compliance. 154 Criminalization
is problematic in various respects. First, it seems antithetical to OUD’s
widely accepted status as a neurological disease that impairs decision making
and inhibitory control, among others. 155 As discussed earlier, 156 when
individuals have a mental illness, treatment for their disorder should be
prioritized, rather than punishment for the disorder’s consequences.
Second, criminalization can be counterproductive. A review of 106
longitudinal studies evaluating the effect of criminalization on HIV
prevention and treatment found a decidedly negative impact, leading
researchers to recommend reform in “legal and policy frameworks
criminalising [sic] drug use.” 157
Criminalization also frustrates the salutary goals of “restorative
justice” that should guide the management of opioid abuse. Restorative
Confronting the Stigma of Opioid Use Disorder--And Its Treatment, 311 JAMA 1393, 1393

(2014) (OUD perceived as a “moral weakness or a willful choice.”).
See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT: A
RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 27 (3d ed. 2018); see also German Lopez, There’s a Highly
Successful Treatment for Opioid Addiction. But Stigma is Holding it Back, VOX (Nov. 15,
2017), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/7/20/15937896/medication-assistedtreatment-methadone-buprenorphine-naltrexone
[https://perma.cc/LP49-XC2X]
(discussing why MAT is not “just replacing one drug with another”).
See R. Craig Lefebvre, The Stigma Shadow over the Opioid Crisis, RTI INT’L (Jan. 17,
2019), https://www.rti.org/insights/stigma-shadow-over-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/RX65MDUG] (noting stigma’s association in opioid addicts with loss of self-confidence and the
belief that they are “untrustworthy, irresponsible, dangerous, and . . . misfit[s]”).
Drug courts generally divide into pre-plea and post-plea models that differ in whether they
require defendants to plead guilty to initiate the process. In both models, however, noncompliance results in criminal prosecution. See Cornwell, Opioid Courts, supra note 44, at
1003. Many mental health courts require a preceding plea of either guilty or nolo contendere.
See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Sharon G. Garner & Veronica E. Bath, Forging Links and
152

153

154

Renewing Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice to Better
Respond to Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 185 (2012).

Research by Dr. Nora Volkow and her colleagues has increased understanding of the
“neurobiology of addiction” and the associated links between addiction and brain function.
See Nora D. Volkow, George F. Koob & A. Thomas McClellan, Neurobiologic Advances
from the Brain Disease Model of Addiction, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 363 (2016),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmra1511480 [https://perma.cc/9ZWT-79DQ].
See supra text accompanying notes 141–43.
Kora DeBeck, Tessa Chang, Julio S. Montaner, Chris Beyrer, Richard Elliott, Susan
Sherman, Evan Wood & Stefan Baral, HIV and the Criminalization of Drug Use Among
People Who Inject Drugs: A Systematic Review, 4 LANCET HIV 357, 371 (2017).
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justice promotes a non-punitive, non-adversarial process where offenders
admit their wrongdoings and become part of the rehabilitative dialogue, with
stakeholders invested in their success. 158 Because accountability is an
important part of restorative justice, victims are always included in the
recovery process. 159 In the context of OUD, there are arguably three victims:
friends and family of the addicted person, the community at large, and the
individuals themselves.
There are numerous initiatives currently underway across the
country that implement restorative justice principles. Among the most
promising is Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD), a communitypolice partnership project that replaces criminal prosecution with intensive
case management providing a wide range of services, including housing and
drug treatment. 160 Diversion programs like LEAD reimagine law
enforcement’s role as community caretakers whose role is more akin to a
servant/guardian than an authority figure meting out sanctions. 161 For
persons with OUD, this reconceptualization is especially critical since
research shows that fear of police contact is the primary reason individuals
who witness overdoses fail to seek emergency medical aid. 162 To combat this
perception, LEAD programs invite individuals to walk into a police station
to obtain help with their addiction without fear of arrest. Specially trained
officers connect those individuals with community-based services, including
MAT, counseling, and medical care. 163
Seattle, Washington was the first jurisdiction to adopt LEAD, and
the results have been extremely promising. A 2017 study found that,
compared to a control group, drug users assigned to LEAD were fifty-eight
See Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg and Tali Gal, Restorative Criminal Justice, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2313, 2321–22 (2013). While criminal justice theory regards crimes as a legal wrong
against the state, restorative justice views it as “a violation of people and relationships.” Mark
S. Umbreit and Marilyn Peterson Armour, Restorative Justice and Dialogue: Impact,
Opportunities and Challenges in the Global Community, 36 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 65, 66
(2011).
While similar to therapeutic jurisprudence, restorative justice views both the addicted
offender and the community as victims of criminal wrongdoing. See Howard Zehr and Harry
Mika, Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, 78–79
(Declan Roche ed., 2003).
How
Does
LEAD
Work?,
LEAD
NAT’L
SUPPORT
BUREAU,
https://www.leadbureau.org/about-lead [https://perma.cc/P72M-DVX2].
See Julie A. Warren, Defining the Opioid Crisis and the Limited Role of the Criminal
Justice System Resolving It, 48 U. MEM. L. REV. 1205, 1264–67 (2019) (discussing LEAD
and other “early diversion” programs).
Leo Beletsky, America’s Favorite Antidote: Drug-Induced Homicide in the Age of the
Overdose Crisis, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 833, 862–63.
See, e.g., Wilmington Police, What LEAD Offers, CITY OF WILMINGTON, NC,
https://www.wilmingtonnc.gov/departments/police-department/policing-services/fieldservices-bureau/lead-program [https://perma.cc/V9ZH-QH6S].
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percent less likely to be rearrested, twice as likely to have housing, and fortysix percent more likely to have received employment or job training. 164 In
recent years, many other jurisdictions have followed suit. LEAD initiatives
now exist in thirty-eight localities, with five more set to launch. 165
Other jurisdictions have pursued similar innovations. Some 400
police departments across thirty-two states have joined the Police Assisted
Addiction & Recovery Initiative, a non-profit organization that, like LEAD,
provides pathways to treatment for addicted individuals who present at a
police station and surrender their drugs. 166 Morris County, New Jersey, has
gone one step further, venturing into the community to invite persons with
addiction to come to them through its Hope One Mobile Outreach
Program. The Mobile Unit is a brightly colored van that travels throughout
the county, setting up tents and providing refreshments to create a
comfortable, welcoming environment for individuals struggling with opioid
addiction to seek treatment. 167 The unit is staffed with mental health
personnel, including a Peer Recovery Specialist, as well as an officer in
plainclothes who, if necessary, can transport an individual to a treatment
facility. 168
VI.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Addiction to opioids—and the disarming mortality risk that
accompanies it—does not lend itself to easy solutions. Unsurprisingly,
federal, state, and local authorities appear to be flailing wildly, sometimes
relying on criminal justice-based initiatives and other times abandoning
them in favor of allegedly non-punitive approaches that range from the truly
restorative to the decidedly less therapeutic. As the nation continues to
grapple with this persistently confounding challenge, the following
fundamental principles should be our guide: OUD is a disabling,
biologically based illness that inevitably leads those who suffer from it to
engage in drug-related crime. Fairness and mercy dictate that we provide
such persons an opportunity, at least initially, to overcome their affliction
without shame, judgment, or stigma.
At present, drug courts bear a disproportionate burden in this fight,
and they are not ideally suited to the endeavor. They resist MAT far too
often and remain tethered to the criminal justice model to too great a
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degree. Mental health courts seem a better option, but they exist in far
smaller numbers and employ the carrot-and-stick of criminal adjudication.
Restorative justice initiatives provide the best opportunity to realize this goal,
and governments need to invest in them. They affirm the dignity of persons
with mental disorders, reduce stigma, and provide the best opportunity for
meaningful, long-term recovery. LEAD on.
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